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The preeminent economic challenge for the Central European Economies in transition (CEEs) is 
to grow rapidly over a sustained period in order to narrow the economic gap with Western 
Europe. If the CEEs grow only slightly faster than the EU, convergence will take several decades 
(see Transition, vol.7, no.1, January-February 1996, p. 6). Poland's income level today is 36 
percent of average income in the EU. Assuming that per capita income grows an average of 1 
percent a year in the EU and 3 percent a year in Poland, it would take forty-six years for Poland 
to reach 90 percent of the average per capita income of the EU. But if Poland manages to boost 
growth to 5 percent per capita a year, the time it takes Poland to reach 90 percent of EU per 
capita income would be cut in half, to twenty-three years. The key issue for Poland and the other 
CEEs, therefore, is how to achieve high rates of economic growth in the next decades. 
To do this, the CEEs will have to do better in the coming years than the recent performance of the 
less advanced EU economies—Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. Although Ireland, Portugal, 
and Spain each grew rapidly in the last five years of the 1980s, that proved to be a short phase—
only Ireland has achieved rapid growth in the 1990s. Greece has never achieved sustained rapid 
growth in the past fifteen years, and Spain and Portugal grew very slowly in the early 1980s and 
the early 1990s. For the fifteen-years during 1980-95, all four countries fell short of 5 percent per 
capita growth. Therefore, instead of being satisfied with these growth rates, the CEEs should 
instead try to match the performance of the countries that have a proven record of sustained 
rapid growth.  
Our list of very fast growing economies (VFGEs) includes Chile, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, Taiwan (China), and Thailand. All are middle-income developing 
countries with populations (in 1989) of more than 1 million. They achieved a per capita annual 
growth rate of at least 4 percent during 1985-94.  
These countries all share important characteristics of economic strategy. Their outstanding 
success is based on four clusters of factors:  
1. Allocative efficiency (the efficiency with which resources are allocated among the various 
sectors of the economy at a point in time) is especially high. They rely mainly on market forces in 
the allocation of resources and have kept government intervention to relatively low levels. These 
countries are further characterized by a high degree of market competition, open trade, flexible 
labor markets, and low taxes, especially on labor income.  
2. Savings and investment rates are high, as a result of high government saving and investment, 
high private saving, and high foreign direct investment. The VFGEs invest considerably in 
infrastructure (energy, communications, and transport), often in support of international trade 
activities. In turn, high private saving seems to be related mainly to a combination of demographic 
characteristics, overall fiscal and regulatory policies, and national pension (retirement) policy, 
based on individual saving accounts run by private pension funds.  
3. The VFGEs have quickly absorbed new technologies from abroad (acquired through promoting 
foreign direct investments and licensing) and have adapted them in domestic production 
(technological upgrading). None of the VFGEs is a major innovator in technology, but all have 
been effective in using world-class technologies to upgrade domestic production and 
infrastructure. The VFGEs have established special economic zones to encourage new export-
oriented industries and science parks for high-tech industries. These economic zones are often 
supported by tax holidays and government provision of infrastructure (such as land, energy, 
communications, warehousing, expedited customs processing, and improved transport links to 
nearby airports and seaports). The government's education policy also helped to achieve high 
growth rates. 
4. The VFGEs also have some natural advantages that have enabled them to pursue rapid 
export-led growth. They are all coastal economies with natural seaports that could be equipped 
with modern container port facilities. On the whole, these are abundant labor economies and 
relatively scarce in natural resources (Chile and Malaysia are the two exceptions in this regard).  
The abundance of labor meant low initial wages and the ability to compete internationally on the 
basis of labor-intensive manufactures (footwear, apparel, textiles, and electronics assembly 
operations). These manufactures provided the starting point for export-led industrialization in 
these economies, except for Chile, where the recent export-led growth has come mainly in 
agriculture and resource-based industries. A scarcity of natural resources has been an advantage 
to economies seeking to establish export-led growth in manufactures—in the past twenty-five 
years such economies have tended to grow more rapidly than resource-rich economies. 
If the CEEs adopt the policies of the VFGEs, the time needed to reach 90 percent of EU per 
capita income can be cut from 120 to 23 years for Hungary, and from 141 to 31 years for Poland. 
Similarly, the time needed to reach 70 percent of the EU average can be cut from 36 to 10 years 
for the Czech Republic, from 45 to 13 years for Hungary, and from 65 to 21 years for Poland. 
Harmonization with the standards of the VFGEs will lead to large increases in expected growth 
rates: the Czech Republic can grow at 6.58 percent, Hungary at 4.61 percent, and Poland at 6.10 
percent. 
The less-advanced EU economies failed to emulate the VFGEs in fiscal policy: Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain (but not Ireland) saw steep increases in public spending and taxation as a percentage 
of GDP during the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, associated with a rising tax wedge (the 
difference between the cost of labor and the net wage), a high and rising unemployment rate, and 
a falling national saving rate. (Ireland bucked the trend after 1986, reducing total government 
spending from 53 percent of GDP in that year to about 43 percent of GDP in 1994.)  
For several reasons the CEEs are subject to the same fiscal pressures as the less- advanced 
economies of the EU: a common ideological commitment to a universal social welfare state; an 
effort to harmonize social, fiscal, and tax policies as well as other areas of economic 
management, including a large government role in the economy; and the political and economic 
ratchet effects of entitlement spending (when generous social insurance systems are in place, 
they are extremely difficult to unwind). This outcome is not inevitable, however. The EU is going 
through deep soul-searching over the role of the state, as country after country reaches a point of 
fiscal stress. Perhaps the CEEs will be able to take a larger step toward a smaller and growth-
promoting state.  
There is no doubt that the CEEs have achieved a stupendous breakthrough in allocative 
efficiency since the start of market reforms. They became full-fledged market economies 
underpinned by administrative, political, and legal changes, in a relatively short period of time—
about half a decade. Within another few years the CEEs should rival the Western European 
economies in other areas of legal and administrative reform, such as banking reform, securities 
market development, and competition policy. 
But the size of the government spending and taxation as a proportion of GDP has not declined 
since the onset of reforms in 1989; total public spending remains about 50 percent of GDP, 
among the highest in the world, and certainly the highest for market economies at comparable 
levels of income. (A sharp cut in budget subsidies to enterprises and households has been offset 
by an equally steep increase in social spending as a share of GDP. The bulk of the increased 
spending went to retirement pensions.) The overall high levels of tax collection are also reflected 
in high marginal tax rates and a tax wedge on labor income that is vastly higher than that in the 
VFGEs, and even that in the less-advanced European economies.  
While overall government spending is very high, budgetary investment spending is low by 
comparison with that of the VFGEs. CEEs have squeezed infrastructure spending excessively to 
make room for large current expenditures, particularly transfer payments. Extremely high public 
expenditure and taxation in the CEEs is likely to lend to substantial disincentives to labor supply, 
rising long-term unemployment rate, encouragement of black-market activities, lower foreign 
direct investment, large public deficits, and a reduction in national saving rates. Many of these 
effects are already at play: public sector saving is lower, deficits are higher, and overall national 
saving and investment rates are far lower in the CEEs than in the VFGEs.  
 
The CEEs have several important growth-promoting tasks in addition to the completion of market 
reforms (especially privatization and financial market deepening) and fiscal reform (especially 
pension reform) to lower tax distortions and raise national saving rates:  
1. A clear target date for membership in the EU is important in order to lock in the economic 
reforms and boost investor confidence. Most of the difficulties of accession can be overcome if a 
few basic principles are recognized:  
• The CEEs need market access, not financial aid from the EU. (In return for rapid accession, the 
CEEs should unilaterally renounce their desire for a significant share of EU structural funds.) 
• The CEEs should join the EU with a long transition period, presumably a decade from the time 
of membership, in which to harmonize agricultural policy and achieve free labor mobility.  
• The CEEs should opt out of the Social Charter (in return for agreeing to a postponement of free 
mobility of labor), because these economies should not be further burdened with high social 
costs. 
2. A coherent medium-term strategy is required for expanded infrastructure investment spending 
(transport, communications, and education) linked to economic integration with Western Europe. 
Science and technology policies should spur productivity growth. 
3. A clear medium-term strategy should provide for the completion of privatization and deepening 
of the rule of law, broad fiscal reform to reduce the share of government spending and taxation in 
GDP, and setting appropriate (and ambitious) growth targets for the next ten years, with the aim 
of emulating the growth performance of the VFGEs. 
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